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Environmental Law
by Travis M. Trimble*
In 2004 courts in the Eleventh Circuit addressed several Clean Water
Act' issues. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals arguably expanded
the scope of the injuries a plaintiff may allege to have standing to sue
under the Clean Water Act. The court held that the federal court had
jurisdiction over a Clean Water Act citizen suit alleging violations of a
permit issued by the State of Georgia under its permitting program
authorized under the Act.2 The Eleventh Circuit also addressed
whether a Florida state regulation effectively revised or added to the
state's Clean Water Act, which mandated water quality standards,
necessitating a formal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") review
and approval of the regulation.3 In an appeal from the Eleventh
Circuit, the United States Supreme Court held that a pump, which
moves contaminated water from one water body to another but does not
itself add pollutants to the water, is nevertheless a point source for
purposes of the Act.4 Finally, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia held that the Corps of Engineers was not
required to produce an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") for the
of one of many
issuance of a Section 404 5 permit for the construction
6
pending reservoir projects in north Georgia.

* Instructor, University of Georgia School of Law. Former Partner in the firm of
Anderson, Walker & Reichert, LLP, Macon, Georgia. Mercer University (B.A., 1986);
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill (M.A., 1988); University of Georgia School of
Law (J.D., 1993). The Author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Amelia
A. Godfrey, University of Georgia School of Law, Class of 2005.
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
2. Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 2004).
3. Fla. Pub. Interest Research Group Citizen Lobby, Inc. v. EPA, 386 F.3d 1070, 1073
(11th Cir. 2004).
4. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95 (2004).
5. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
6. Ga. River Network v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1329
(N.D. Ga. 2004).
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In addition, the Eleventh Circuit directed the EPA to determine
whether, under Georgia's state-implemented Clean Air Act 7 permit
program, a power company could be denied a pre-construction permit for
a new major stationary source of air pollutants because it was a partowner of an existing noncompliant major stationary source. 8 Finally,
the Eleventh Circuit, under the Wilderness Act 9 and the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),' ° addressed the National Park
Service's use of vehicles to transport tourists on a road that runs
through the Cumberland Island wilderness area."
I.

CLEAN WATER ACT

A.

Standing
In Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors,Inc.,12 the Eleventh Circuit held,
among other things," that plaintiffs had standing to sue under the
Clean Water Act'4 ("CWA") when plaintiffs alleged that defendants,
who owned and operated a scrap metal recycling business adjacent to
plaintiffs' property, allowed contaminated storm water to migrate onto
plaintiffs' property.' 5 Plaintiffs also had standing when plaintiffs
alleged that defendants allowed contaminated storm water to migrate
into a stream that was not on plaintiffs' property even though plaintiffs
16
did not allege any harm to them resulting from that contamination.
The court also held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs'
CWA claims despite the fact that the claims alleged violations of the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit
conditions, which were administered by the State of Georgia under its

7. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000).
8. Sierra Club v. Leavitt, 368 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2004).
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2000).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
11. Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004).
12. 386 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 2004).
13. Plaintiffs filed suit in the Northern District of Georgia, asserting violations of the
CWA and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") as well as claims for
contribution under the Georgia Hazardous Site Response Act, O.C.G.A. section 12-8-90,
negligence, nuisance, and trespass. The jury found defendants liable under all theories and
awarded plaintiffs $1.5 million in damages, which the court reduced to $1 million.
Defendants appealed on numerous grounds. Parker,386 F.3d at 1002.
14. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
15. Parker,386 F.3d at 1003-04.
16. Id.
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program and had been authorized by the EPA pursuant to
own permit
17
CWA.
the
In Parkerplaintiffs owned property in Covington, Georgia (the "Parker
property"). Defendants owned and operated a metal recycling facility
(the "SMP facility") on adjacent property that the EPA had previously
determined was contaminated with metals, petroleum products, solvents
and paint wastes, discarded drums containing hazardous substances,
and discarded underground storage tanks. In 2001 plaintiffs discovered
contamination on their property, which they reported to the Georgia
Environmental Protection Division CEPD"). The EPD determined that
the SMP facility was the probable source of the contamination. Storm
water from the SMP facility flowed across the Parker property,
depositing contaminated dirt and sediment and causing erosion. The
storm water also flowed into a stream located on property adjacent to
the facility and owned by one of defendants. Defendants had neither the
storm-water discharge permit the CWA required nor the required
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") permits. However,
defendants did obtain the storm-water permit prior to the commencement of litigation.'
Before addressing the lower court's determinations, the Eleventh
Circuit addressed two threshold issues raised by defendants on appeal:
standing and subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the federal
claims.' 9 The court first held that plaintiffs had standing under the
CWA.2" To have standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an "injury-infact," caused by the defendant's conduct, and the plaintiff must have
requested relief likely to redress the injury.21 Regarding the first prong
of the standing test, injury-in-fact, the court determined that plaintiffs
showed "water runoff originating on the defendants' property caused
hazardous substances ... to migrate onto the Parker property, where
the substances contaminated the soil and eventually made their way into
the stream. This injury is fairly traceable to the defendants' alleged
failure to obtain or comply with their . . . NPDES permit." 22 In other
words, the incidental injury from defendants' failure to comply with an
NPDES permit was sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of the

17. Id. at 1005. States are authorized to implement CWA NPDES permit programs
pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2001). Id.
18. Id. at 1001-02.
19. Id. at 1002-05.
20. Id. at 1003-04. The court also held plaintiffs had standing under RCRA. Id.
21. Id. at 1003.
22. Id. at 1003-04.
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standing test under the CWA.2" This incidental injury was sufficient,
even though the injury was in addition to and did not necessarily result
from the contamination of a body of water that the NPDES permit
requirement was intended to prevent.24
Next, the court addressed its subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs'
CWA and RCRA claims.2 ' Among other things, defendants contended
that because Georgia has implemented its own programs under these
statutes, plaintiffs' claims arose under state law and not federal law.2"
After examining the relevant language in the CWA and United States
Supreme Court precedent, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "a plain
reading of this statute indicates that state permits and conditions fall

23. Id.
24. Id. The dissent contended that plaintiffs lacked standing under the CWA because
plaintiffs did not allege any harm resulted from the stream's pollution. Id. at 1021
(Forrester, J., dissenting). The majority never directly addressed this point, stating that
for standing, plaintiffs may show only that "the value of their property was diminished, at
least in part due to the pollution from the polluting facility." Id. at 1004 n.11. The
majority and dissent both cited Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000), in support of their positions. The majority claimed that
Laidlaw "belies the dissent's conclusion" because in that case
Gail Lee [one of the members of the plaintiff group] "attested that her home,
which is near Laidlaw's facility, had a lower value than similar homes located
farther from the facility, and that she believed the pollutant discharges accounted
for some of the discrepancy." There is no suggestion in the Supreme Court's
opinion that Lee alleged an aesthetic or recreational injury, or that Lee was a
riparian owner, but the Supreme Court held that her sworn statement adequately
demonstrated an injury-in-fact.
Parker,386 F.3d at 1004 n. 11 (citing Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 182-83).
The court's characterization of Laidlaw in Parker is slightly misleading. The quoted
language from Laidlaw recounted the testimony of Lee, who was one of numerous members
of the plaintiff group whose testimony the Supreme Court summarized. Laidlaw, 528 U.S.
at 183. All of the members, but Lee, alleged that they actually used the waterway at issue
or would use it but for the pollution. Id. The United States Supreme Court summarized
their testimony for the proposition that 'environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury
in fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons 'for whom the
aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened by the challenged activity.'"
Id. (citation omitted). Although Lee appeared to allege an economic injury, which is also
sufficient for CWA standing, rather than an aesthetic or recreational one, the clear
implication in Laidlaw is that plaintiffs, including Lee, alleged injuries that directly
resulted from the water in issue's lessened quality, which was due to defendant's pollution
and not merely injuries caused by defendant's pollution, when the pollution also happened
to contaminate a navigable water in violation of the CWA. Id. at 183-84.
25. Parker,386 F.3d at 1004-06. Because the rest of plaintiffs' claims were state law
claims, the court's jurisdiction over the entire case depended on it having jurisdiction over
at least one of the federal claims. See id. at 1005 n.12. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2005).
26. Parker, 386 F.3d at 1005. The CWA authorizes states to implement their own
NPDES permit programs after receiving EPA approval. Id.
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within the effluent standards of conditions covered [by the CWA]" 27 and
that "the Supreme Court apparently has incorporated state law
standards under the CWA into federal environmental law for jurisdictional purposes. ,,28
Regarding its jurisdiction over plaintiffs' RCRA claim, the court noted
that an EPA-approved state implementation program under RCRA,
unlike the CWA, operates "'in lieu of the federal program. ' The court
declined to determine if the "RCRA grants federal courts jurisdiction
over citizen suits alleging a violation of an EPA-approved state law
under the RCRA." ° The court ultimately did not decide the RCRA
jurisdiction question, concluding that, because it had jurisdiction over
plaintiffs' CWA claims, it had supplemental jurisdiction over the RCRA
claim. 3
The court determined there was sufficient evidence on the merits to
support the jury's determination that defendants were liable under the
state law theories for the CWA and RCRA claims.32 However, the court
remanded the case for a new trial on damages because the district court
failed to instruct the jury that plaintiffs, who were not owners of the
Parker Property prior to filing the complaint, could not recover
damages. 3
B.

Water Quality Standards

In Florida Public Interest Research Group Citizen Lobby, Inc. v.
Environmental ProtectionAgency, 34 the Eleventh Circuit remanded the
case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida to determine whether a Florida administrative rule3 5 actually
changed or added to the CWA water quality standards, which would
have required a full review of the new regulation by the EPA."6 The
Florida administrative rule was adopted ostensibly to provide criteria for
the state to use in evaluating if state waters should be designated as

27. Id. at 1005-06.
28. Id. at 1006.
29. Id. at 1006 n.13.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1008.
32. Id. at 1015.
33. Id. at 1018-19. Only one of the plaintiffs, Quebell Parker, had an ownership
interest in the property during the events at issue in the case. After the institution of the
lawsuit, Mrs. Parker created a joint tenancy in the property with the other two plaintiffs,
her daughter and son. Id. at 1000 n.2.
34. 386 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter FPIRG].
35. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 62-302.200 to .800 (1997).
36. 386 F.3d at 1073, 1089.
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"impaired" under Florida's separate water quality standards, which were
adopted pursuant to the CWA" The court held that plaintiffs, Florida
Public Interest Research Group ("PIRG") and other
groups, had standing
38
and had presented a claim that was not moot.
The substantive issue the case presented was whether the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection ("FDEP") modified the state's
existing water quality standards by establishing a new rule.3 ' The
CWA requires each state to establish water quality standards for all its
bodies of water.40 The standards must designate permissible use or
uses of the water body and must also set basic criteria for the level of
water quality necessary to allow the water body's designated use or uses
safely. Each state may express the criteria numerically or narratively.41 While the state initially establishes its own water quality
standards, the EPA must undertake a review of any new or revised
water quality standards adopted by the state. 42 Any new or revised
43
state rule cannot allow further degradation of a water body's quality.
The state must also maintain a list of waters it deems unsafe for its
intended uses, known as the "Impaired Waters List." Once the state
determines a water is impaired, both the state and federal governments
must take action to control and remedy the pollution.4
Florida's water quality standards regulations, which set the maximum
levels of pollutants that each water body can contain without becoming
unsafe for use, state, among other things, that "[u]nless otherwise
stated, all criteria express the maximum not be exceeded at any time. "
The rules also provide that "[i]n no case shall nutrient concentrations of
a body of water be altered so as to 46cause an imbalance in natural
populations of aquatic flora or fauna."
In April 2001 FDEP adopted an "Impaired Waters Rule," the stated
purpose of which was to "'interpret existing water quality criteria and
evaluate attainment of established designated use.'"47 The rule further
provided that its purpose was "not ... to establish new water quality

37. Id. at 1074.
38. Id. at 1085, 1088.
39. Id. at 1073.
40. 40 C.F.R. § 131.2 (2004).
41. FPIRG, 386 F.3d at 1073.
42. Id. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(a) (2000). When the EPA undertakes such a
review, the rule defines the issues it is required to consider. FPIRG, 386 F.3d at 1073.
43. FPIRG, 386 F.3d at 1073.
44. Id. at 1074.
45. Id. at 1075 (quoting FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 62-302.530).
46. Id.
47. Id. (citation omitted).
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criteria or standards."48 The EPA provided the FDEP guidance in
drafting the Impaired Waters Rule, but the EPA did not conduct the
official review, which the CWA would require for any new or revised
water quality standard.49
Plaintiffs sued under the CWA's citizen suit provision to force the EPA
to conduct the review required of new or revised water quality standards. Plaintiffs contended that the Impaired Waters Rule effectively
created new or revised water quality standards by first requiring more
than a single sample from a water body to exceed a maximum concentration level of a pollutant before the water body would be deemed impaired
(contradicting the standard that no maximum limit would be exceeded
at any time); and second, by adopting specific nutrient concentrations to
assess nutrient impairment, which do not exist in the water quality
standards. Plaintiffs claimed that the water quality standards instead
prohibited any nutrient imbalance from affecting natural populations of
plant or animal life. Additionally, plaintiffs contended that the effect of
the Impaired Waters Rule was a "more forgiving, looser water quality
standard,"" which, as a practical matter, resulted in the state removing over two hundred waters from the Impaired Waters List. 1 The
court noted that waters removed from the list were "no longer subject to
procedures used to clean up impaired waters."" Even though the EPA
reviewed the state's de-listing decisions individually and re-listed some
waters, it did not formally review the rule or require Florida to change
either the rule itself or its53application of the rule in future updates to
the Impaired Waters List.

The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.5 4 As described by the Eleventh Circuit, the district court first
reasoned that to amend the water quality standards, FDEP had to follow
the rule-making procedure in Florida's Administrative Procedure Act.55
Because FDEP did not do so, no amendment occurred. 8 Second, the
court reasoned that an amendment to the standards required formal

48. Id.
49. Id. at 1076-77.
50. Id. at 1075.
51. Id. 1080 n.14. The parties disputed the exact number of water bodies de-listed by
the FDEP's application of the Impaired Waters Rule. Because the EPA reviewed the delistings individually and re-listed some the court found that at least over one hundred
water bodies had been removed from the list and not replaced by the EPA. Id.
52. Id. at 1080.
53. Id. at 1079-80, 1080 n.13.
54. Id. at 1080.

55. FLA. STAT. ch. 120.54 (2002).
56. FPIRG, 386 F.3d at 1081.
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EPA approval.57 Because the EPA did not obtain that approval, no
amendment occurred.5" Finally, the court reasoned that because the°
terms of the Impaired Waters Rule stated that its purpose was not to
criteria or standards, none could have
establish new water quality
59
legally been established.
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court and remanded
the case, holding that the district court was "required to conduct an
independent inquiry into the actual effect of the Impaired Waters Rule"
to determine whether the rule "has the [practical] effect of loosening
Florida's water quality standards."0 The court stated,
if waterbodies that under pre-existing testing methodologies would
have been included on the [impaired waters] list were left off the list
because of the Impaired Waters Rule, then in effect the Rule would
have created new or revised water quality standards, even if the
language of the regulation said otherwise. This is the crux of the
matter.6'
If the district court were to find that the rule did create new or revised
standards, then the EPA would have a non-discretionary duty to review
criteria set out in the EPA's own rules and its antithe rule according to
62
degradation policy.
C.

NPDES Permit-PointSource

In South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians,6 3 the United States Supreme Court held that a pump that did
not itself generate pollutants but merely conveyed pollutant-containing
water into a navigable water was a point source under the CWA. The
Court further held that the pump's operation required a National
The
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit."
farwith
potentially
an
issue
not
decide,
but
did
Court also discussed,
reaching effects on governmental water management projects: The
waters" approach to defining "navigable waters" under the
"unitary
65
CWA.

57. Id.
58. Id.

59. Id.
60. Id. at 1089-90.
61. Id. at 1090.
62. See id. at 1088.
63. 541 U.S. 95 (2004).
64. Id. at 105.
65. Id. at 105-06.
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The South Florida Water Management District (the "District")
manages a system of canals, pumps, and levees constructed in the early
1900s by the Corps of Engineers to control flooding in south Florida.
Prior to the system's construction, rain water in the area at issue
drained south and east and joined groundwater to form a single large
wetland. The system artificially separated the drainage into western
and eastern sides, keeping the eastern side relatively dry and habitable.
Presently, rain water that falls on the populated eastern side of the levee
is collected in a canal and pumped over the levee into a wetland on the
undeveloped western side, which is part of the Everglades ecosystem. 6
Describing the process, the Court stated, "[t]he combined effect of [the
levees and canal] is artificially to separate the [canal] basin from [the
wetland]; left to nature, the two areas would be a single wetland covered
in an undifferentiated body of surface and ground water flowing slowly
southward."67 However, rain water that falls on the eastern side of the
drainage also absorbs contaminants, primarily phosphorus from
fertilizers, which are then trapped in the canal and eventually pumped
into the wetland on the western side. 8
The Miccosukee Tribe ("the Tribe") and another organization filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
to enjoin the District's operation of the pump that conveys the phosphorus-containing water from the canal on the eastern side of the levee to
the wetland on the western side of the levee. Plaintiffs argued that the
pump was a point source that discharged pollutants into "navigable
waters," as defined in the CWA, for which the District did not have an
NPDES permit. The district court granted summary judgment to the
Tribe, ruling that the District was required to obtain an NPDES permit
for the pump. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 9
In its appeal, the District and the federal government as amicus made
three separate arguments that the pump did not require an NPDES
permit. First, the District's pumping of water from the canal to the
wetland did not constitute an addition of pollutants from a point source
within the meaning of the CWA because no pollutant originated from the
pumping process. 7° Second, the CWA did not require a permit for the

66. Id. at 98-100.
67. Id. at 101.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 103. The Eleventh Circuit decision is reported at 280 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir.
2002).
70. Id. at 104-05. The CWA prohibits "any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source" except in compliance with an NPDES permit, which places
limits on the type and quantity of pollutants that may be discharged. Id. at 102. A "point
source" is in turn defined as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance from which
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conveyance of unaltered water from one body of navigable water to
another (the "unitary waters" argument).7 ' Finally, the canal on the
eastern side of the levees and the wetland on the west were actually two
parts of a single, interconnected body of water, and thus, the act of
pumping water from one to the other simply moved water around within
the same
water body rather than adding anything to a separate water
72
body.
As to the first issue, the Court held that the pump could be considered
a point source that discharged pollutants to navigable waters and thus
could require an NPDES permit. 73 The Court noted that a point
source, by definition, is any "discernible, confined and discrete conveyance"74 and stated "[that definition makes plain that a point source
need not be the original source of the pollutant; it need only convey the
pollutant to 'navigable waters' . . ..
The Court discussed the second issue at greater length but did not
decide it. 76 In its "unitary waters" theory, the Government as amicus
argued that because the CWA definition of the discharge of a pollutant 77 does not contain the word "any" before "navigable waters,"
Congress did not intend to regulate the transfer of one "navigable water"
into another. Instead, the Court concluded that Congress intended to
regulate only the introduction of pollutants from a source other than a
navigable water into navigable water.78
The Court raised several potential problems with the "unitary waters"
theory of defining navigable waters. 79 The Court noted that other parts
of the CWA suggest that "the Act protects individual water bodies as
well as the 'waters of the United States' as a whole" and that the
approach "could also conflict with current NPDES regulations."' 0 The

pollutants are or may be discharged." Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000) and 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362 (2000)).
71. Id. at 103-06. There was no dispute that the canal and the wetland were both
navigable waters within the CWA's definition. Id. at 102.
72. Id. at 108.
73. Id. at 105.
74. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 109.
77. Id. at 105. The CWA definition of the discharge of a pollutant is "any addition of
any pollutant to navigable water from any point source." Id. at 105-06.
78. Id. at 106. The Government's and other amici's primary concern with the Eleventh
Circuit's holding appeared to be the regulatory burden it could place on public water supply
networks, particularly in the west, that rely on water supply and flood control from the
engineered transfer of water among various bodies of water. Id. at 108.
79. Id. at 105-06.
80. Id. at 107.
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Court acknowledged that if it were to adopt the "unitary waters"
approach, the District could operate its pump without an NPDES
permit.8 1
However, the Court ultimately declined to resolve the
"unitary waters" issue because petitioners did not raise the argument
before the Eleventh Circuit or in their petition for certiorari, and because
the Court would vacate the grant of summary judgment to the Tribe and
remand the case to the Eleventh Circuit based on the third issue raised
by petitioners.8 2 The Court noted that the issue would be available to
petitioners on remand.8 3
The Court remanded the case on the third issue raised by petitioners,
which petitioners had also raised below: The canal and the wetland
were actually one hydrologically connected body of water, and thus, no
NPDES permit was required to move water around in it.5 4 The Court
acknowledged there was significant evidence in the record that the two
bodies of water were in fact one.85 Most notably, the record reflected
the possibility that if the pump was shut down, the canal would quickly
flood and possibly join the wetland to form one body of water, which in
turn "might call into question the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that [the
pump] is the cause in fact of phosphorus addition to [the wetland]." 6
The Court noted that the district court found that the canal and wetland
were separate without considering this evidence, and therefore, the
Court remanded the case for further development of the record.8 7
D.

Section 404-NEPA Environmental Impact Statement

In Georgia River Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,"" the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held
that the Corps of Engineers ("Corps") was not required to issue an
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") prior to issuing a CWA section
404 permit8 9 to defendant Henry County Water and Sewerage Authority ("HCA") to deposit fill material into Tussahaw Creek to construct a

81. Id. at 106.
82. Id. at 109.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 111-12. The parties did not dispute that if the canal and wetland were found
to be two parts of the same water body, pumping water from one side to the other would
not constitute the addition of pollutants and thus would not require an NPDES permit.
Id.
85. Id. at 110.
86. Id. at 111.
87. Id. at 111-12.
88. 334 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
89. Section 404 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2001), requires a party seeking to place
dredge or fill material into waters of the United States to obtain a permit from the Corps.
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dam and reservoir. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiffs' motions to
enjoin the Corps from issuing the permit.9 0
In 2000 HCA applied for a section 404 permit to construct a reservoir
on Tussahaw Creek in the Upper Ocmulgee River Basin to meet the
water needs of its booming population. At the time the court issued its
opinion, HCA's reservoir was one of forty-three reservoirs planned in
Georgia, many in the north due to the population growth in the Atlanta
metropolitan area. Furthermore, no comprehensive statewide plan
existed to manage water resources, resulting in what the Corps
described as a "race for permits" and the issuance of permits on a firstcome, first-served basis for north Georgia counties seeking reservoirs.9 1
During the comment phase of the HCA's permit process, both the EPA
and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service recommended that the Corps
deny the permit, citing the need for a comprehensive assessment of the
impact of pending reservoir permits in north Georgia. 2 However, after
conducting an Environmental Assessment ("EA"), the Corps determined
that HCA~s reservoir did not pose a significant impact to the environment93 and issued to HCA a 404 permit with mitigation conditions.9 4
Using the Eleventh Circuit's four-part test to determine whether an
agency decision not to prepare an EIS was arbitrary or capricious,95 the
court reviewed the record before the Corps regarding direct, cumulative,
and indirect impacts of the reservoir on wetlands, aquatic and wildlife
habitat, and water quality and quantity. The court found in each case
that the Corps had properly concluded either that the reservoir had no
significant impact, or that the mitigation HCA was required to perform
as part of the 404 permit would reduce the cumulative impact to a
minimum on wetlands and streams.96
The court also determined that the Corps did not need to perform a
comprehensive EIS, examining the impact of all pending reservoir

90. Georgia River Network, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1332.
91. Id. at 1332-33.
92. Id. at 1333.
93. "Finding of No Significant Impact," or FONSI. NEPA and its relevant regulations
require an agency to assess the environmental impact of a proposed agency action to
determine whether it will have a significant impact on the environment. If so, the agency
must perform an EIS. If not, the agency issues a FONSI. Id. at 1335.
94. Id. at 1333.
95. Under Hill v. Boy, 144 F.3d 1446 (11th Cir. 1998), the agency must have accurately
identified the relevant environmental concern; it must have taken a "hard look" at each
concern when preparing an EA; it must make a convincing case for a FONSI; and if the
agency finds a significant impact, it can still avoid preparing an EIS if it finds that changes
or safeguards in the project reduce the impact to a minimum. Georgia River Network, 334
F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
96. Id. at 1341-42.
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decisions in north Georgia.9 7 The court noted that a comprehensive
EIS was sometimes warranted when the agency's projects were either
regional or systemic in scope, or when a project was "one of a series of
interrelated proposals that will produce cumulative systemwide effects
that can be meaningfully evaluated together."" The court, however,
determined that the Corps limited its review of the project's scope to the
Ocmulgee basin, and plaintiffs did not challenge the scope. Thus, the
reservoirs were not part of a regional plan or program."9 Nothing in
the record showed that the forty-two proposed reservoirs had a
significant cumulative impact on a discrete area, thus eliminating the
need for a comprehensive EIS.100
II. CLEAN AIR ACT
In Sierra Club v. Leavitt,1 ° ' the Eleventh Circuit held that the EPA
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in upholding a state agency's issuance
of a preconstruction permit for a major stationary source of air
pollutants under the Clean Air Act ("CAA").' °2 In doing so the EPA
failed to explain why the permit applicant, who was part owner of
another non-compliant major stationary source, was entitled to have only
the parts of the non-compliant source it actually owned considered for
of the rule
the purposes of its compliance with the requirements
103
governing the issuance of preconstruction permits.
In Sierra Club respondent Oglethorpe Power Corporation ("Oglethorpe") applied to the Georgia Environmental Protection Division
("EPD") in 2000 for preconstruction and Title V operating permits for
Block 8, an unbuilt "power block" it had acquired from Georgia Power
Company. Block 8 was located at part of Plant Wansley, a coal-fired

97. Id. at 1343.
98. Id. at 1342 (citing Isaak Walton Legal of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 374 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)).
99. Id. at 1343. The construction of a large number of reservoirs in north Georgia in
the absence of a comprehensive water use plan, which perhaps would take into account the
environmental impacts over a large region, was no doubt one of the problems plaintiffs
sought to address by attempting to obtain a comprehensive EIS from the Corps. The court
recognized as much when it stated that "[n]o reasonable person can disagree with Plaintiffs
that some comprehensive consideration of the use of water resources in north Georgia
should be considered. Plaintiffs, however, may have chosen the wrong reservoir in the
wrong place to use NEPA as the tool to accomplish this goal." Id. The court indicated that
this issue was better addressed by the state. Id.
100. Id.
101. 368 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2004).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000); Sierra Club, 368 F.3d at 1309.
103. Id.
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power plant in Heard County, Georgia."0 4 When it applied for the
permits, Oglethorpe was the owner of two of the four power-generating
units at Plant Scherer, which is also in Georgia. The other two
generating units at Scherer were owned by Georgia Power, and Plant
Scherer was out of compliance with its Title V operating permit due to
emissions from Georgia Power's units. Oglethorpe's units at Scherer
were not out of compliance.105
Georgia's State Implementation Plan, adopted to implement the CAA,
requires a so-called "preconstruction permit" for the construction of a
new or modified "major stationary source," which the CAA defines as
"any stationary source (or any group of stationary sources located within
a contiguous area and under common control)" that emit in excess of a
defined amount of air pollutants."0 6 The relevant Georgia administrative rule (the "Georgia Rule") governing the issuance of preconstruction
permits provides that
[N]o permit to construct a new or modified major stationary source...
shall be issued unless . . . (3) [t]he owner or operator of the proposed
new or modified source has demonstrated that all major stationary
sources owned or operated by such person (or by an entity controlling,
controlled by, or under common control with such person) in this State,
are subject to emission limitations and are in compliance, or on a
schedule for compliance, with all applicable emission limitations and
standards under the Act. 07
Petitioner Sierra Club challenged Oglethorpe's permit application before
the EPD, which issued the permit in 2002. Sierra Club petitioned the
EPA to object to the issuance but the EPA declined. Sierra Club then
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. 10 8
The issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether, under the Georgia
Rule, Oglethorpe should have been issued preconstruction and Title V
operating permits for its new unit at Plant Wansley when it was an
owner of two constituent units comprising Plant Scherer, which in turn
was out of compliance with its Title V permit because of two other plant
units that Georgia Power owned, not Oglethorpe.' °9 The court noted
that the Georgia Rule was ambiguous in this situation, for example,

104. Id. at 1303.
105. Id. at 1305.
106. Id. at 1302 n.1 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7661 (2003)).
107. Id. at 1305 (quoting GA. COMP. R. & REGS. R. 391-3-1-.03(8)(c)(3)).
108. Id. at 1301.
109. Id. at 1304, 1306-07. The court assumed arguendo that because two of its four
units were out of compliance, Plant Scherer, as a major stationary source under Title V,
was out of compliance. See id. at 1306 n.10.
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when the permit applicant "owns part of a noncompliant major
stationary source."11 ° The court went on to note that when a regulation is ambiguous, the court follows Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc."' and defers to the agency's interpretation of the regulation. 1 2 However, here the court concluded that
deference was not appropriate because the EPA "failed entirely to
address or explain part of the problem it faced."' 13 The court noted
that the EPA had presumed, without explanation, that when the
applicant co-owned a non-compliant major stationary source, the Georgia
Rule allowed the agency to consider the compliance status of only that
portion of the source owned by the entity applying for the permit.114
The court interpreted the EPA's finding in an implicit determination
into
that "the Georgia Rule allows breaking major stationary sources
" 115
constituent parts with compliance determined individually.
The court determined that in so doing, the EPA treated the two
appearances of the term "major stationary source" in the Georgia Rule
as having different meanings." 6 In other words, for the purpose of
determining that Oglethorpe needed a preconstruction permit for its unit
at Plant Wansley, the agencies determined that the unit was part of a
single major stationary source because it was on contiguous property and
under common control." 7 However, when considering whether all the
major stationary sources that Oglethorpe owned or controlled were in
compliance under the CAA, the agencies considered the units it owned
at Plant Scherer separately from those Georgia Power owned. The court
stated that in the EPA's order upholding the permit issuance,
the EPA failed even to note that it ha[d] defined the same term, major
stationary source, in two different ways, and it failed to acknowledge,
much less explain or justify, the implicit policy decision driving the
creation of the two definitions-that for the purposes of the Georgia

110. Id. at 1304 (emphasis added).
111. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
112. Sierra Club, 368 F.3d at 1304.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1305-06. Both EPA and EPD adopted the term "facilities" to describe and
focus on only those power generating units owned by Oglethorpe, rather than "major
stationary source," which is the term required by the rule. Id. at 1305. Thus, the agencies
were able to conclude that "all of Oglethorpe Power's facilities in Georgia are in compliance
with all applicable requirements." Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1304.
117. Id. at 1303 n.6.
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Rule, "major stationary sources" may be broken into separate parts
with compliance determined individually." 8
The court noted that the rules of statutory interpretation require a
consistent interpretation for a term appearing twice in statutory
language and that while "[tihese principles of statutory interpretation
are not absolute, [the] EPA should offer something more before
abandoning them.""' 9
For these reasons, the court held that the EPA's decision upholding
EPD's permit issuance was arbitrary and capricious."2 ° The court
refused to address the EPA's post-hoc justifications for interpreting the
term differently within the same rule because the explanation was a
"litigation position" in its brief and the agency itself did not articulate
or explain its justification based on information it had during its
decision-making process. 12 The court vacated the order upholding
Oglethorpe's permit and remanded the case to the agency for further

consideration. 122
III.

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT/WILDERNESS ACT

In Wilderness Watch v. Mainella,12 the Eleventh Circuit held that
the National Park Service ("Park Service") violated the Wilderness
Act 22 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1769 ("NEPA")125 when it began transporting visitors in motor vehicles through
wilderness area to visit historic sites on
Cumberland Island's designated
26
the north end of the island.
Cumberland Island, on the Georgia coast, was declared a National
Seashore in 1972. In 1982 Congress designated 19,000 acres of the
island to either wilderness or potential wilderness, including much of the
northern end of the island. Park Service land on the island also includes
two historic sites on the north end: Plum Orchard and the Settlement.

118. Id. at 1306.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1303.
121. Id. at 1307.
122. Id. at 1309.
123. 375 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2004).
124. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2000).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
126. Wilderness Watch, 375 F.3d at 1096. The portion of the court's holding regarding
the Wilderness Act has apparently been rendered moot by the passage of Public Law No.
108-447 (2004), the omnibus spending bill signed into law on December 8, 2004. This law
contains provisions by Representative Jack Kingston of Georgia that redraw the wilderness
area on Cumberland Island to exclude the road at issue in this case.
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sites is by a one-lane dirt road that runs through
Vehicle access to these
27
the wilderness area.
The Park Service has traditionally used the road to access the sites for
maintenance purposes as needed. In 1999 the Park Service began
providing vehicle transportation to the sites for island visitors, first in
four-person vehicles then in a fifteen-passenger van on a regular
schedule. After litigation commenced in 2002, the Park Service began
transporting visitors to Plum Orchard by boat and discontinued van
to use the van and the road to take visitors
service there, but continued
1 28
to the Settlement.
Plaintiffs filed suit to enjoin transportation of visitors by vehicle across
the wilderness area, contending that the practice violated the Wilderness
129
Act's restriction on the use of motor vehicles in a wilderness area.
Plaintiffs further argued that under NEPA, the Park Service should
have conducted a review of the practice's potential environmental
impacts before it began.'30
The Park Service contended that its transportation of visitors to the
historic sites was permissible under the Act because (1) the Park Service
required vehicle access to meet its separate obligation to maintain the
historic structures in the wilderness area, which is part of its duty to
"further the purposes of the Wilderness Act," and (2) under the Act,
designated wilderness may be used for "public purposes."' 3 ' Regarding
the NEPA claim, the Park Service admitted that it did not perform an
to
environmental impact review, but argued that its activities relating
3 2
the sites' maintenance were exempt from NEPA requirements.
The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to
Regarding plaintiffs' Wilderness Act claim, the
the Park Service.'

Id. at 1088-89.
Id. at 1084, 1090 n.6.
The Wilderness Act prohibits the use of motor vehicles in a wilderness area
as necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area."
16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2000).
130. Wilderness Watch, 375 F.3d at 1087. Under the NEPA, federal agencies must
document "the potential environmental impacts of significant decisions before they are
made, thereby insuring that environmental issues are considered by the agency and that
important information is made available to the larger audience that may help to make the
decision or will be affected by it." Id. at 1094.
131. Id. at 1090.
132. Id. at 1094. The Park Service cited a regulation of the Council on Environmental
Quality that excluded from the NEPA environmental impact review requirement any
'routine and continuing government business, including ... administration [and]
maintenance ... activities having limited context and intensity; e.g., limited size and
magnitude or short-term effects." Id.
133. Id. at 1087-88, 1096.
127.
128.
129.
"except
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court first noted that the Park Service's obligation to maintain the
historic structures came from the National Historic Preservation
Act,13 4 and not from the Wilderness Act. 1 5 The court determined
that the purpose of the Wilderness Act was the maintenance of a
designated area in its natural state. 3 1 In any event, the court concluded that "[t]he Park Service's decision to 'administer' the Settlement
using a fifteen-passenger van filled with tourists simply cannot be
construed as 'necessary' to meet the 'minimum requirements' for
137
administering the area 'for the purpose of the [Wilderness Act].""
The court further held that the language of the specific Wilderness Act
provision at issue and the Wilderness Act's overall purpose and structure
demonstrated that "Congress has unambiguously prohibited the Park
Service from offering 3motorized
transportation to park visitors through
8
the wilderness area.",
3 9
The court also concluded that the Park Service violated the NEPA.
The court held that for the Park Service to rely on the regulatory
exclusion from NEPA requirements for routine government business, it
would have had to show it considered whether the exclusion applied to
the proposed activity in question before undertaking the activity, which
the Park Service did not do. 4 ° However, the court rejected the
argument that the categorical exclusion for 'routine and continuing
government business' included the agency action.' 4 The court concluded that "obtaining a large van to accommodate fifteen tourists hardly
appears to be 42
a 'routine and continuing' form of administration and
maintenance. 1

134. 16 U.S.C. § 470 et. seq. (2000).
135. Wilderness Watch, 375 F.3d at 1091.
136. Id. at 1092.
137. Id. at 1092.
138. Id. at 1094.
139. Id. at 1095.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1094.
142. Id. at 1095. The court's holding regarding the NEPA issue does not specifically
state that the Park Service should have performed an environmental impact review. Id.
The holding appears to be that the Park Service violated NEPA by failing to determine,
prior to making the decision to transport visitors through the wilderness area, whether the
exclusion for "routine and continuing government business," including relevant exceptions
to the exclusion, applied to this activity. Id. The court's NEPA holding may be more
significant after the legislative revision to the wilderness area designation on Cumberland,
which apparently renders moot the court's holding that the Wilderness Act prohibited the
transportation of passengers in vehicles through the area.

